Why STRIDE Breaks When You Threat Model AI Agents (And What to Do Instead)
STRIDE was built for deterministic systems. Agentic AI breaks its core assumptions. Here is a five-zone method that actually finds EchoLeak-class attacks.
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AI systems break the boundary between code and data. Threat models built before LLMs miss most of what matters. Notes on red teaming, threat modeling for agents, and the practitioner's view of what classical security thinking can and cannot say about a model.
4 posts.
STRIDE was built for deterministic systems. Agentic AI breaks its core assumptions. Here is a five-zone method that actually finds EchoLeak-class attacks.
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